Possibly the most significant and pressing problem currently confronting constitutional government in the United States is the necessity to effect a balance between the rights of the individual and the rights of society. Nowhere is this problem more obvious than in the conflict surrounding recent applications by the courts of the self-incrimination clause of the Fifth Amendment to the criminal accused.
NON-COERCIVE INTERROGATION AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE: THE IMPACT OF MIRANDA ON POLICE EFFECTUALITY
JAMES W. WITT* Possibly the most significant and pressing problem currently confronting constitutional government in the United States is the necessity to effect a balance between the rights of the individual and the rights of society. Nowhere is this problem more obvious than in the conflict surrounding recent applications by the courts of the self-incrimination clause of the Fifth Amendment to the criminal accused.
Much of the current debate over the rules protecting the rights of suspects against self-incrimination swirls around the controversial Escobedo' and Miranaa 2 decisions. Countless negative allegations, regarding the impact of these rulings on law enforcement and crime in general, have been circulated by spokesmen both in and out of law enforcement. Since most of these allegations have no foundation in fact, this study is designed to empirically examine the impact that Miranda has had on the effectiveness of one western police department. This writer has made an effort to deal with this topic both from the theoretical viewpoint of a scholar and the practical viewpoint of a former police officer. The main conclusion to be drawn from this study is that the Miranda decision does not appear to have had a significant impact upon that effectiveness.
Most of the concern over the Miranda decision emanates from the belief that the ruling has had a detrimental impact upon police interrogation procedures directly and police effectiveness indirectly. The problem of what constitutes proper police interrogation practices in a democratic society is not new.
BACKGROUND
Historically, the revulsion against police interrogation was spawned from the displeasure caused by judicial inquisition in political cases. 3 Interrogation has become a police function for-* Head, Department of Criminal Justice, Armstrong State College.
I Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U. S. 478 (1964) . 2 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966) .
3 Wigmore, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination: Its History, 15 HARv. L. REv. 610 (1902) .
tuitously and it has never been legally sanctioned. 4 However, even without legalization, questioning has been felt by some authorities to be "an indispensable instrumentality of justice." 5 Due to the increasing Supreme Court supervision over state police interrogation practices, one of the most perplexing and contentious questions in American criminal procedure has evolved-should law enforcement authorities be permitted to utilize post-arrest questioning?
The arguments championing the elimination of, or the placing of vigorous restraints upon, postarrest questioning seem to rest upon several interrelated premises. Some writers hold the guarantees of the Bill of Rights to be more important than any reduction of police efficiency caused by restrictions on police interrogation. 6 Other writers examine the psychological aspects of post-arrest questioning and conclude that the safeguards provided by recent Supreme Court decisions are almost futile.? These writers appear to be making a case for the complete elimination of post-arrest questioning. However, one writer finds the psychological aspects of incommunicado interrogation to be less damaging to one's mental health than the stresses of everyday life. 8 A few authorities expound the virtues of the modern scientific techiques for detection, which they feel should preclude the need for any questioning in many 4 MAYERS, STsAT Wx AENwN THE Firm AmENDmENT? 87 (1959) .
cases. 9 Seemingly their rationale is that, in most cases, the utilization of modem investigative techniques should cause the arrest to take place, only after the investigation produces sufficient evidence to sustain it. Finally, others recognize that police interrogation is an established practice but they perceive its dangers. This group advocates that interrogation be used under controlled conditions' 0 Support for those advocating the necessity of post-arrest questioning can be found in preMiranda decisions relative to confessions u in the argument that it serves as a means for innocent suspects to clear themselves,"2 and in its utility for averting a breakdown of the trial court system."3 Generally, the most prevalent justification for this position rests in the contention that it is necessary for effective law enforcement in modem urban life. & C. 1017 (1934) where the author advocated questioning in the presence of counsel before a magistrate as a solution to the excesses of post-arrest questioning. It is interesting to note that Pound, too, was writing at a time when "law and order" was a major issue in the United States.
Realizing the futility of trying to fortify the rights of criminals during this period, Pound's solution was to eliminate the justification for illegal interrogation, i.e., to preserve law and order by substituting a procedure that offered safeguards for the accused. In contrast to the antagonists of post-arrest interrogation, the protagonists seem to reason that a stable and safe society is dependent upon an efficient police department. Therefore, some sacrifices of individual rights and liberties must be made in order to achieve this end. Also intertwined with this rationale is the assumpti6n that "men with honest motives and purposes do not remain silent when their honor is assailed. "' 7 To all appearances, most of the above arguments fail to surpass the narrow bounds of emotion. Therefore, it is imperative that such an important issue be subjected to empirical analysis.
METHODOLOGY
Upon examining the literature during the initial phase of this study, the author found that very little reliable data were available regarding the behavior and attitudes of law enforcement officers or their interrogation procedures. There are no dissertations dealing with the topic. Since 1965, there have been several published studies, of varying degrees of sophistication, analyzing the effects of either the Escobedo or Miranda decisions on law enforcement;s however, most of these studies are preoccupied with the impact of these decisions on obtaining confessions, rather than the interrogation process 9 From those studies dealing with police interrogation procedures, the 
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author.was able to avail himself of a pre-tested questionnaire. and some tried methods of analysis.
In order to test for police effectiveness, it was necessary to tap information contained in police files. Normally, this source is unavailable to social scientists; however, being a former police officer the writer was able to gain access to the files of a West Coast police department. The Chief of the department in question, a former supervisor of the writer, was gracious enough to open his department's files to the author. However, he requested that the department not be identified in the study, hence the pseudonym "Seaside City."
Seaside City, California, is an eight-square-mile enclave in the Los Angeles metropolitan area, with a population of 83,249 at the time this study was effected. 20 Only 6.2 per cent of the population is nonwhite,R and the median income is $6,845 per year.n2 Educationally, the residents average 12.3 years of completed school work and 57.3 per cent finished high school.2
Although principally a residential community, a major aircraft manufacturing facility and numerous small manufacturing firms and subcontracting firms are located within its city limits. The University of California at Los Angeles is situated near enough to make Seaside City an attractive place for many academicians to reside. A large urban renewal program has been instrumental in clearing away some of the worst slums in the beach area of Seaside City. These slums have been replaced by luxury high rise apartments.
Since Seaside City is a semitropical beach city located within a major metropolitan area, law enforcement is a complex business. Nearly 12 million people visit its beach recreation areas every year, and its location makes it an attractive place for social undesirables to congregate. Consequently, there has been a steady rise in Seaside City's "Crime Index" ' Id. at 1-341. 2Id. at 1-337. All of the above figures are higher than the national median for cities in the same category as Seaside City.
24 See Seaside City's ANmuAL REPoRT-1967 REPoRT- -68, 6 (1968 . 21 Seven. crimes-murder, forcible rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny ($50.00 and over in value) and auto theft-are used by the FBI as an index to measure crime. See CRIME iN =H UNTED STATEs,'UNIFOR CRIu
a rise that has kept it in the upper five per cent of the cities of comparable size. Due to the geographic location of Seaside City, the make-up of its residents, and the fine quality of police employed by the city, its crime patterns will not resemble those of other cities of comparable size; therefore, one should be very cautious about drawing generalizations from this study and applying them to cities of comparable size.
Tnn DEPARTMENT At the time of this study, there were 128 police officers in Seaside City, exclusive of 39 civilian employees. These men were organized into three divisions-investigation, uniform and staff services. Twenty-five of the officers were assigned to the detective bureau and three to the vice squad. The department was under the supervision of a chief, who could be categorized as a progressive "oldtimer."
Although the department's salaries and benefits were higher than the national average for municipal police officers, the department experienced a high rate of personnel turnover. This was probably due to the attractive opportunities available in private industry in Southern California. In order to offset this situation, the department had instituted a 'Tolice Cadet" program 0 and a helicopter patrol.
Since this study is basic in nature,, no attempt will be made to test precise assumptions. Only tests of general assumptions will be made. The assumptions to be tested are, on the one hand, that the Miranda decision has hindered police effectiveness, and, on the other, that it has not. From numerous casual discussions with law enforcement officers, materials from* other studies, and the media, it was ascertained that police officers felt that the Miranda decision was adversely affecting them in five areas: (1) in the outcome of formal interrogation, (2) in the collateral functions of interrogation, (3) in the amount of stolen property recovered, (4) in their conviction rate, and (5) in their clearance rate. Therefore, these five assumptions will be tested as a measure of police effectiveness. Before testing these assumptions, an attempt will be made to ascertain the police's evaluation of the importance 28 Under this program, college students, 18-25 years of age, are paid to work under the supervision of veteran officers at a multiplicity of assignments. When the cadet reaches the age of 21 and/or has enough college credits, he can qualify to become a regular police officer.
[Vol. 64 of interrogation and determine the need for interrogation.
In order to test these former suppositions, data were obtained from the ifies of the Seaside City Police Department. Due to limited time and resources, only cases dealing with murder, forcible rape, robbery 27 and burglary were utilized in this study. It would have been desirable to have used data predating 1964, but all files prior to that data were unavailable. The area of inquiry was further narrowed by using only those cases in which suspects were actually arrested and incarcerated by the Seaside City Police Department. This eliminated all cases in which suspects were detained for questioning but never incarcerated. As the result of this elimination process, 478 cases remained to comprise the sample. Each of these cases was read and analyzed by the author who, in many cases, used analytical methods gleaned from the New Haven Study."
The author fully recognizes the problems involved in trying to prove a causal relationship between Miranda and the various assumptions to be tested; however, this does not preclude the establishment of trends. This study differs from those cited above in that more assumptions are tested and, whenever possible, comparisons are made with other studies. The general working hypothesis of this study was that police effectiveness was being impaired by the Miranda decision. It was further anticipated that a high degree of negative impact would be found when each of the above assumptions were tested.
Th SEsmE CITY STDY
In the wake of the Supreme Court decisions limiting police interrogation came utterances by scholars, 9 police officials and prosecutors" and jurists" portending a foreboding future for law enforcement. Most of these observers discerned a correlation between police interrogation and effective law enforcement. formation was offered by any of these critics to support their grim premonitions.
In order to ascertain the degree of importance placed upon interrogation by investigative personnel in the Los Angeles area,2 forty-three detectives were asked to respond to the following question: "Are there ways in which investigation could possibly replace interrogation as a means for crime solution?"" The responses to the question, which is similar to the one responded to in the New Haven Study, compare favorably with those obtained by the New Haven interviewers, even though differences in approach make it difficult to compare the data in the immediate undertaking with those of other germane studies.
In the New Haven Study 71 per cent of a sample of 21 detectives felt that interrogation was indispensable, 19 per cent thought that it was not absolutely necessary for effective law enforcement, but it would be too costly to replace, and 10 per cent felt that the elimination of interrogation would not impede their work. 4 Therefore, when asked abstractly, the results indicate that the respondents in the immediate study perceived interrogation to be necessary for effective law enforcement.5
In order to collate surety with reality, i.e., determine whether interrogation is essential to 1" Only veteran detectives, who had been same prior to the Escobedo decision in 1964, were utilized in this portion of the study in order to secure a more valid perspective of the problem.
"Since the Seaside City Police Department did not have an adequate number of personnel that could qualify as respondents, detectives froi the Los Angeles Police Department and the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department were utilized in this portion of the study. This does not seem to present a methodological problem because of the following: (a) the departments have adjacent jurisdictions that overlap in some instances, .(b) the crime problem is the same in the three jurisdictions, i.e., major metropolitan crime, (c) the caliber of personnel appears to be the same, and (d) these personnel are equally well trained.
"'The respondents in both studies perceiving an absolute need for interrogation differed in their reasons. In the New Haven Study 54 per cent thought interrogation was necessary due to the lack of evidence in many cases and 46 per cent saw its need resting in its complemental effects. See New Haven Study, supra note 18, at 1592, note 195. Cf. Table 1. 35 It should be noted that during the interviews none of the respondents criticized the courts for excluding involuntary confessions. Their primary concerns were that legal interrogation procedures were being emasculated and that interrogation might be completely eliminated in the future. Using the "Evidence-Investigation Scale" set forth in the New Haven Study,37 a judgment was made regarding the amount of evidence available in each case for a conviction. Admittedly, the danger involved when a researcher attempts to assume the role of judge and jury is immense. However, judgment in this instance was fortified by the researcher's seven years of police experience and his numerous years of studying the law 11 See Interrogation in New Haven, supra note 18. 17 Id. at 1582-1588. and the court system. On the basis of these data, the need for interrogation was categorized as being "essential", "important", "not important", or "unnecessary"P. The number of "essential" and "important" interrogations should be one indicator of the importance of interrogation to the solution of the specific crime for which the suspect is accused. It should be recognized that interrogation has other uses than merely solving crimes. These uses will be examined later. Table 2 indicates that interrogation was found to be "necessary", i.e., "essential" or "important", in only 24 per cent of the cases reviewed. Generally, the figures in Table 2 compare favorably with those in the New Haven Study, where interrogation was deemed "necessary" in only 13 per cent of the cases, "not important" in 9 per cent, and "unnecessary" in 77 per cent of all cases. After taking into account the possible bias involved in gathering the data, it appears that in most cases interrogation was not needed to solve the immediate crimes for which the suspects were accused.
0 Hence, if the respondents were referring to crime in general when they equated the necessity n Interrogation was deemed "essential" if there appeared to be no physical evidence, witnesses or other investigative substitutes; "important" if there were some small leads, but very little other evidence; "not important" if a sizable amount of evidence existed for conviction or little difficulty was foreseen in securing same; and "unnecessary" if the evidence seemed to exist overwhelmingly against the suspect. See the New Haven Study, supra note 18, at 1583-1584.
3 Interrogation in New Haven, supra note 18, at 1585.
The 11 per cent difference in the finding relative to the "necessity" to interrogate may be due to the writer's bias, when analyzing his data. Due to the court's current preoccupation with the accused's civil rights and the difficulties involved in predicting the amount of evidence needed for conviction, there probably was a tendency by the writer to overestimate the amount of evidence needed for conviction in some cases. In a field patrol setting, the results of the President's Crime Commission Study revealed that in all of the 30 felony arrests observed, there was enough evidence for arrest without the need for field interrogation. Reiss and Black supra note 18, at 56. In an examination of 47 murder, burglary and robbery cases, Sobel found that confessions secured through interrogation were "essential" or "helpful" in only 21 per cent of the cases. See
Sobel, supra note 18, at 146. 4 0 Any comparisons drawn between the findings in the New Haven Study and the immediate study must be guarded, due to the quality of the personnel interviewed and the crime problem in each jurisdiction. Based upon the New Haven Study's observations as compared with the writer's, the Seaside City personnel would appear to be more professionalized. Also, the New Haven police are not confronted with the same crime problems as those encountered by departments in large metropolitan areas. to interrogate with the solution of crimes, their assumptions are not supported by the above data.
OuTcom oF FORMAL INTERROGATION
The respondents were in almost complete agreement over the effect that the Miranda warnings were having on the outputs of formal interrogation. Most believed that they were getting many fewer confessions, admissions and statements. Hence, one could assume that since the police have been required to fulfill the Miranda requirements, there has been a considerable decrease in the quantity of confessions, admissions and statements being obtained by law enforcement officers.
In order to test this assumption, a comparison was made between the various outputs of formal interrogation prior to the Seaside City Police Department's compliance with the Miranda dictum and the outputs subsequent to the compliance. For the purposes of this comparison, July 1, 1966 was the date when the Seaside City detectives began to observe the Miranda precepts. Dorado, 398 P.2d 361 (1965) , expanded the scope of the Escobedo decision in California. Dorado required the police to advise a suspect of his right to counsel before interrogating him. Even though the California police were restrained more than police in other jurisdictions by this ruling, most officers agreed that their chances for useful interrogation were not significantly impaired by Dorado. Since the respondent's principal complaints were directed toward Miranda, the date when it took effect was used for this comparison. Table 312 reveal that questioning was successful" in 69 per cent of the cases before complying with the Miranda requirements, and in 67 per cent of the cases after compliance. There was a drop of 7 per cent in the number of signed confessions after compliance, but this figure is inconclusive due to procedures followed by the Seaside City detectives."
The figures in
Another comparison of some consequence can be made between the pre-Miranda year of 1964 and the post-Miranda year of 1967-years in which the arrest rate was almost the same. In 1964, 67 per cent of the interrogations were successful, as compared with 71 per cent in 1967. Furthermore, the police were able to secure oral admissions of 41 Table 3 is a modified version of a table used in the New Haven Study, supra note 18, at 1589, n. 184.
4"Successful" as used in this context means that the police were able to get a signed confession, an oral admission of guilt, a signed incriminating statement or some type of oral incriminating evidence or other useful material for conviction through interrogation. 44 From the files, it was impossible to make any determination regarding Miranda's impact on the Seaside City police's ability to secure signed statements or confessions. This material was not appended to the reports. Although it is the department's policy to secure a signed statement whenever possible, the reports did not reflect that this policy was being followed. From conversations with the detectives, it was obvious that since Miranda and the court's preoccupation with procedural matters, they do not want to question suspects in cases where they have enough evidence to convict without interrogation. The human factor is probably involved here, too, in that unenterprising detectives can now rationalize their indolence. Table  3 indicate, there were no attempts made to interrogate 16 per cent of the suspects in 1968. One would seem to be on firmer ground in holding that Miranda had an indirect effect on successful interrogation. Table 3 also reveals that more suspects were refusing to talk to the police. Again, this could be due to Miranda; however, due to the small percentage of increase in this figure, it would seem that there could be a more plausible answer. This increase may simply be the result of enlarged publicity via the mass media or verbally from 4 1 It is noteworthy that from January through June, 1966, i.e., before the Miranda requirements took effect, the police were successful in 74 per cent of their interrogations. However, after initiating their warning procedure in July, they were successful in 80 per cent of their interrogations for the remainder of the year. No. % confidants and others through which suspects have been made more aware of their rights. Generally speaking, the above assumption does not seem to be supported by the data. There is little indication from the above data that the Miranda requirements have materially affected the outcome of formal police interrogation in Seaside City. Although different approaches were used, the findings of some of the other interrogation studies lend support to this conclusion.
6

COLLATERAL FUNcTIONS OF INTERROGATION
When responding to the question, "In what ways besides getting evidence for trial is the information from interrogation used?" the interviewees cites several collateral functions performed by the interrogation process.
a Most respondents were quick to point out that the performance of these functions had been considerably impeded by the Miranda decision. Hence, the assumption that interrogation provides the means 46 After Escobedo, the Detroit Study recorded a mere 2.8 per cent drop in the confession rate. Souris, s=pra note 18, at 1573. The New Haven Study registered a "10 to 15 per cent" decline in the number of suspects giving incriminating evidence, supra note 18, at 1573. However, the New Haven researchers attributed this decline to factors other than Miranda. Id. at 1563. The Pittsburgh Study discovered a 16.9 per cent drop in the confession rate subsequent to Miranda and attributed this decline largely to Mirandae Seeburger and Wettick, supra note 18, at 11.
47 Table 4 is a slightly modified version of its counterpart in the New Haven Study. Interrogation in Newa Haven, supra note 18, at 1593 n. 197. [Vol. 64 by which several important collateral functions needed for effective law enforcement are fulfilled. Since the Miranda decision, these functions have been seriously curtailed in Seaside City.
In looking at Table 5 , one perceives that the police were able to obtain additional information in four important areas as the result of interrogation. In a five-year span, the police were able to implicate accomplices in 12 per cent of the interrogations1 8 solve other crimes in 18 per cent 4 9 recover stolen property in 10 per cent, and help suspects clear themselves in 15 per cent of the cases 50 where post-custodial questioning was utilized.
The interesting figures in Table 5 are those depicting the decline in the percentage rate of the instances in which the police were getting collateral results from interrogation. This decline is accompanied by a parallel increase in the percentage of cases in which no collateral results were being obtained. The reasons listed above for the decline in the rate of successful cases of interrogation might well apply here, but it might well be the case that Miranda has had an adverse impact on these figures. For example, the Seaside City detectives did not significantly curtail their efforts to interrogate suspects until 1968.5 Yet, as Table 5 indicates, in the year following Miranda there was a 2 per cent drop in instances of accomplice implication, a 10 per cent decrease in the crime clearance figures, and a 3 per cent decline in cases where stolen property was recovered through interrogation. Prior to Miranda, there had been a steady increase in these figures. Table 5 reveals that interrogation has furnished some important collateral benefits for law enforcement in Seaside City and that there has been a diminution of these benefits since the Miranda decision. Therefore, it would appear that the above 48 The results of the New Haven Study indicate that interrogation helped the New Haven police to identify or implicate accomplices in 27 out of 90 cases, or 30 per cent of the time; however, they downgrade these results. Interrogation in New Haven, supra note 18, at 1593-94. 49 The New Haven researchers found that interrogation was instrumental in clearing 12 unsolved crimes or "... 10 to 15% of all crimes investigated..." during their study. Id. at 1595 n.203. The clearance rate variable is one that is open to serious questions as to its utility. This will be discussed further, when the clearance rate of the Seaside City police is analyzed.
50 This figure coincides with the numerous incidents, related by the respondents, of suspects refusing to talk due to legal advice not to do so, or befuddlement as the result of being issued the Miranda warnings.
51
See assumption has received some corroboration from the data.
EFFECT OF THE MIRANDA DECISION ON THE PER-
CENTAGE OF STOLEN PROPERTY REcovERD
Another problem of grave concern for the respondents was what they perceived to be a decline in their recovery rate of stolen property. They attributed this decline to Miranda because of the restrictions it imposes upon their talking to suspects. In contrast to the New -Haven Study where only 9 per cent of the respondents felt that recovering stolen property was a reason for interrogation, 23 per cent of the respondents in the Seaside City Study held this view.
2 From this information it is possible to assume that, due to the restraints imposed upon the interrogation procedures by the Miranda requirements, the police are recovering less stolen property. From the figures in Table 6 it would appear that if questioning suspects is a major criterion for recovering stolen property, Miranda is having little, if any, impact on the Seaside City police. Over a ten-year period, the Seaside City police -See Table 4 supra. NOTE: Average rate of recovery for the above period = 10.6 per cent per year.
recovered an average of 10.6 per cent of their stolen property each year. In the pre-Miranda years, they recovered 10.7 per cent of their stolen property. In the three post-Miranda years, they recovered the same amount-10.7 per cent. If the 15 per cent recovery rate in 1969 is not an aberration, an argument could be made that Miranda has helped the recovery rate by requiring more stringent investigation. This argument could gain some support from the figures in Table 5 that indicate a sharp decrease in the amount of stolen property recovered through interrogation.
Regardless of how one chooses to interpret the above data, the results do not seem to be consistent with the assumption.
CONVICTION RATE
The number of accused convicted at the trial stage would seem to afford another indicator of the impact of Miranda upon law enforcement effectiveness. The respondents continuously cited instances to the interviewer in which cases were dismissed at the trial level due to some legal technicality. Many of these technicalities, according to the respondents, had their roots in the Miranda requirements. They also felt that limitations on the interrogation procedures were keeping them from building stronger cases at a time when they were greatly needed. Therefore, one could assume that procedural technicalities, emanating from Miranda and Miranda's impact upon the police's efforts to build strong cases through interrogation, have resulted in a decrease in the conviction rate. Table 7 contains the figures for all felony convictions in Seaside City for a nine-year period as taken from the Department's annual reports. Since the data regarding convictions were not available in any other form, the total conviction rate for these periods will be used for the purpose of this study. Hence, the specific cases used in this study are included in these figures. As evinced in [Vol. 64 Table 7 , there was a 9 per cent drop in the conviction rate-from 92 per cent of 841 cases in the pre-Miranda years to 83 per cent of 384 cases in the pQst-Miranda period. Other figures reveal that 64 per cent of the 83 per cent of those found guilty in the post-Miranda period were found guilty of lesser offenses. This is in contrast to the 55 per cent in the pre-Miranda period.D In testing the above assumption, the figures contained in Table 8 -reveal that in most of the 478 cases examined in this study, there was very strong evidence against the accused when he went to trial. When this fact is added to the remarks made by many of the interviewees chiding the district attorney's office for prosecuting only "sure" cases, the above assumption appears to be somewhat doubtful.
55
The above facts in conjunction with the data from 61 The fact that District Attorney Younger is informed in the matter can be seen in a comment from his study. Upon acknowledging that his office's conviction rate had dropped 10.2 per cent due to the exclusion of several confessions with consequential acquittals, Mr. Younger remarked, "Since each of these 22 cases was filed prior to Miranda, we can anticipate that this same problem will not occur when cases filed after Miranda reach the superior court." See Younger, supra note 18, at 38-39. NOTE: Percentages indicate the per cent of cases each source of evidence was utilized. Since each case might contain several sources, the percentages will not total 100. necessary in only 24 per cent of the cases handled by the Seaside City police, would indicate that only strong cases reached the trial stage. With the outcome of the case at the trial level being dependent upon such imponderables as attorneys' acumen, judges' attitudes, jury capriciousness and witness availability, it would be difficult to attribute a drop in the conviction to a specific court decision or, for that matter, court decisions generally. Second, the prosecutor's office might have the tendency to reduce charges in cases where the conviction of a felony could involve grave additional problems for the accused, to circumvent a mandatory minimum sentence, or to avoid a community obloquy that could be affixed to an accused convicted of certain offenses.
To test this assumption adequately, one would have to examine each case in which an accused was found not guilty or guilty of a lesser offense and tabulate the reasons for these results. Since these data were not available, the evidence for the above assumption would have to be deemed inconclusive.
5 6 This refers to the procedure whereby the prosecutor and defense counsel will negotiate an agreement by which the accused pleads guilty either of a lesser charge or for a more desirable sentence recommendation by the prosecutor.
THE CrLARrcE RATE 57
Again, most of the respondents were quick to refer to a decline in their clearance rate when discussing problems emanating from the Miranda decision. Other police officials have expressed the same concern,51 and justification for these apprehensions can be found in the UNuoni CRiME REPORTS. In the years 1960-1968 the Crime Index rose 122 per cent, but the Clearance Rate declined to -32 per cent. 59 Hence, one could assume that the clearance rate is adversely affected by court decisions which limit the police's ability to question suspects about crimes--crimes which they might have committed other than the one for which they are charged. [Vol 64
Seaside City Police Department and were available in no other form. The cases utilized in the present undertaking are included in these totals. As the figures in Even though crimes can be cleared through interrogation, many authorities question the use of the clearance rate as a means to measure law enforcement efficiency.! In many instances the suspect will help the police solve other crimes as a means of mitigating his own circumstances; therefore, what is accomplished? The case has usually been lying dormant in the pending file and the stolen property, if any, is seldom recovered.
The data above would appear to lend some corroboration to the assumption being tested. police to interrogate fewer people, either through indolence or fear of losing their principal case on technicalities, then Miranda does affect the dearance rate. This conclusion must be guarded because it is possible that the trend in the clearance rate may change. One could conclude from the above data, as did Pye in his article,".. .that the data now available do not support the repeated assertions that the right to interrogate is a panacea for a dropping clearance rate."
' 6 From the results of the Seaside City Study, one would have to conclude that Miranda's impact on the effectiveness of law enforcement in that area has been meager. It is highly improbable whether any true analysis of Miranda's impact on law enforcement can be made from data like that presented above. If Miranda has had an impact, this would be more likely to show up at the filing stage" of the legal proceedings and these data are not available for analysis. Also, and very importantly, there is no way of determining how many cases never reach the filing stage due to the impact of Miranda.
The available studies of this problem, including the immediate study, are limited both in size and implication. However, none suggests the thesis that the confession decisions are fossilizing the interrogation process. Although the results of this study do not lend themselves to generalization, they do seem to suggest reservations about any unqualified claim that interrogation is valueless.
CONCLUSIONS
The crucial problem of attaining a balance between individual rights and societal interests lies at the heart of the controversy over post-arrest interrogation. The solution to this problem cannot be found in the Framers' intent or in abstract theories of individual rights. It must be found in the context of the times. Normally, in a representative democracy, the development of systems of criminal procedure is the prerogative of the legislature; however, in the United States, the judiciary, on occasion, has been charged with this task. This study was initiated to evaluate the impact that the handiwork of the judiciary has had upon the effectiveness of the police.
6 See Pye, supra note 6, at 412. 1 4 This is the stage where the police present their case to the district attorney and he decides whether there is enough evidence for trial. By being restricted in their interrogation procedures, the police could be restrained from building a strong enough case for trial.
What has been the impact of the Miranda decision on police effectiveness? A review of the various studies dealing with the topic indicates that the impact of Miranda has been slight. In the immediate study it was found that even though the officers conceived interrogation to be essential in solving most crimes, it was actually necessary in only about one quarter of the cases surveyed. Furthermore, an analysis of 478 cases by the author produced very little indication that the Miranda requirements had materially affected the outcome of formal police interrogation, or any other factors such as the recovery of stolen property. Even though there had been a decline in both the conviction and clearance rates of the Seaside City Police Department, for the reasons set forth in this study one would be hard pressed to attribute those declines specifically to Miranda.
Interrogation performs many collateral functions for the police. It is here that the impact of Miranda was more distinct. The police were found to be implicating fewer accomplices, clearing fewer crimes and recovering less property through interrogation, and helping fewer suspects clear themselves. Therefore, the writer concludes that the impact of Miranda on law enforcement in the jurisdiction studied was slight. This substantiates the findings of related studies. The results do not support the thesis that police interrogation is unnecessary.
In order to balance the scale upon which rest the rights of the individual and the interests of society, the proponents in each camp will have to realize that they are playing a game of give-andtake. Those championing the rights of the individual must be ready to sacrifice some individual rights and liberties in order to foster a type of society in which all can enjoy a certain measure of rights. On the other hand, those championing the cause of society must understand that police efficiency has to yield on occasions to the rights and liberties of the individual.
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